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The output of a simulation model does not, prima facie, appear to have an objective status 
comparable with data captured by observation or experiment.  Counter to this Winsberg, 
Humphreys and others emphasise parallels between experiment and simulation in practices 
which are said to “carry with them their own credentials” (Winsberg, 2010).   Humphreys 
holds that that the physical implementation of computer models places constraints on 
simulation methods not present in traditional mathematics, creating essential epistemic 
opacity.  By this he means that it is impossible for a cognitive agent, given its characteristics, 
to know all of the epistemically relevant elements of a computational process.   Humphreys 
views essential epistemic opacity as reflecting the limitations not of the simulation method 
itself but of the human agent, and thus as evidence for a “non-anthropocentric epistemology” 
recognising computational tools as a superior epistemic authority. 
 
The possibility of testing a highly parameterised simulation model via the 
hypothetico-deductive method can indeed be open to doubt; moreover empirical 
measurements are often not available on the scale needed to evaluate model outputs.  Even 
were appropriate data available, Lenhard & Winsberg (2010) argue that climate simulation 
models face epistemological challenges associated with a novel kind of “confirmation 
holism”: it is impossible to locate the sources of the failure of any complex simulation to 
match known data, so that it must stand or fall as a whole.  This is because of three 
interrelated characteristics which they regard as intrinsic to the practice of complex systems 
modelling – “fuzzy modularity”, “kludging” and “generative entrenchment”.   
 
 In “fuzzy modularity”, different modules simulating different parts of the 
complex system are in continual interaction, thus it is difficult to define clean 
interfaces between the components of the model.   
 A kludge is an inelegant, ‘botched together’ piece of program, very complex, 
unprincipled in its design, ill-understood, hard to prove complete or sound and 
therefore having unknown limitations, and hard to maintain or extend.    
 Generative entrenchment refers to the historical inheritance of hard-to-alter 
features from predecessor models.   
 
Is confirmation holism  
(1) essential to and unavoidable in complex systems modelling?   
(2) embedded in specific disciplinary practices of climate science?   
or  
(3) does it exemplify a failure to observe, recognise and apply available and well-
established sound Software Engineering practices when developing simulation 
software (as promoted, for example, by the Sustainable Software Institute)?   
Belief in the essential epistemic opacity of computational science points to (1) but we shall 
argue for (3) on two main grounds.   
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 Firstly, where a large software system is epistemically opaque with respect to 
a human agent, this opacity is not an essential characteristic arising from its 
size but is contingent upon development practices and in particular upon 
architectural design. A software architecture captures basic design decisions 
which address such issues as performance, reliability, security, maintainability 
and interoperation.  Decomposition into manageable components is an 
essential architectural strategy for managing complexity.  Failure to perform 
such decomposition at the design stage will certainly make the software itself 
epistemically opaque, but it would be perverse to regard this as endowing the 
results with superior authority or the capacity to carry its own credentials.   
 Secondly, credulity towards simulation software runs entirely counter to the 
institutionalised local scepticism common to both experimental science and 
software engineering practice. 
    The Engineering Science oriented towards underpinning and evaluating Software 
Engineering practice is widely known as “Empirical Software Engineering”.  An important 
subject of recent empirical research is that of “Architectural Defects” in large software 
systems.  As remarked above, a kludge is code which is ill-understood and (therefore) hard to 
maintain: it is a software defect waiting to manifest itself.  A study of defects in a long-lived 
large software system, which had undergone multiple versions and releases, found that 
defects which span more than one software component required more than 20 times as many 
changes to correct, compared to single-component defects, and were 6 to 8 times more likely 
to persist from one release to another (Li et al, 2011).   A further line of research concerns the 
consequences of making early programming decisions on a purely pragmatic basis (e.g. in 
order to get the system working); it has been shown that such short cuts create “Technical 
Debt” on which interest will accrue in the form of error and maintenance costs throughout the 
lifecycle of the software product (Kruchten et al, 2012). 
In software engineering practice, defects are expected: human activity is error-prone. 
Yet well architected software is not epistemically opaque: its modular structure will facilitate 
reduction of initial errors, recognition and correction of those errors that are perpetrated, and 
later systematic integration of new software components.  Nothing intrinsic to complex 
simulation modelling prevents the application of these principles, but kludging in the early 
stages of model building will create “Technical Debt” which will be charged in the form of 
actual (not essential) epistemic opacity.  Simulation software is epistemically opaque (when it 
is) not because of the inability of human agents to check through every possible execution 
path from beginning to end (an impossible feat, but unnecessary in well architected software), 
but because of a failure of model builders to adopt the practices which are known to promote 
surveyability and effective error management.  A simulation model must be understood as a 
tool which can play a part, along with other resources, in a scientific argument; such an 
argument depends upon human judgement which, fallible though it may be, cannot 
legitimately be replaced by an allegedly superior epistemic authority.  The argument from the 
essential epistemic opacity of computational science to a non-anthropocentric epistemology 
runs counter to best practice in software engineering and to empirical results of software 
engineering science.  In this respect it is self-defeating. 
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